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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section
78-2a-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(1)

Whether the trial court incorrectly calculated the child support

arrearages by misinterpreting an ambiguous provision of the child support order.
Specifically, whether the trial court failed to reduce child support as each child
reached age eighteen. As the question of whether a divorce order is ambiguous is a
question of law, it is reviewed by the Court for correctness, without deference to the
trial court. Bettinger v. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389 (Utah App. 1990). This issue was
preserved below at R. 145.
(2)

Whether the trial court erred in failing to bar enforcement of the

claim for child support arrearages under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The
standard of review on this issue is abuse of discretion. State, Dept. of Human Services
ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 893 P.2d 1107 (Utah App. 1995). This issue was preserved
below at R. 48.
(3)

Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to

Appellee, in light of the trial court's correct factual findings that no evidence was
presented as to the financial need of the parties, and that the parties had very similar
incomes at the time of trial. An order for attorney's fees in a divorce case is reviewed
1

using an abuse of discretion standard. Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1988).
This issue was preserved below at R. 202.
Appellant has not included some additional issues initially raised in his
docketing statement, because they were rendered moot at this level by the Court of
Appeal's recent decision regarding choice of law in State, Depart, of Human Services
v. Jacobv. 1999 WL 93075 (Utah App. 1999).
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3.
Wyo. Stat. Ann § 14-1-101.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-6-304.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case

This case involves a dispute between former spouses, Chris and Cora
Rockwood, over whether an arrearage is owed for child support, and, if so, the
amount of the arrearage.
II

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court

After the Office of Recovery Services unilaterally started collecting 34% of his
take-home pay for ongoing child support, Chris Rockwood filed a pro-se Petition to
Modify Divorce Decree and Subsequent Orders in the Fourth District Court of Utah
County, and sought to domesticate his Wyoming divorce in Utah. (R. 6). On March

17, 1997, the Court Clerk sent notice to both parties of the registration of Wyoming
orders. (R. 20). Mr. Rockwood served Mrs. Rockwood; but on April 9, 1997, Cora
Rockwood, through counsel, moved to Quash Service of the Petition to Modify. (R.
34). The Court entered an Order Quashing Service on April 21, 1997. (R. 35). Mr.
Rockwood then hired counsel and filed an Amended Petition to Modify Divorce
Decree on April 30, 1997. (R. 31). The Amended Petition was properly served on
May 1, 1997. (R. 37). The Amended Petition sought an order setting the amount of
Mr. Rockwood's ongoing child support.
In response to the Petition to Modify, Mrs. Rockwood filed an appropriate
Answer and Counterpetition. (R. 46). The Counterpetition sought, among other
things, a determination of child support arrearages allegedly owed by Mr. Rockwood.
Mr. Rockwood timely filed an appropriate Reply to the Counterpetition denying that
any arrearages were owed. (R. 49).
On May 15, 1997, the parties entered into a stipulation modifying child support
during the pendency of the proceeding and setting support for the parties' one
remaining minor child at $301.79 per month. (R. 40).
After appropriate discovery and settlement discussions, the matter came before
the Court for trial on March 3, 1998. (R. 87). After trial, both parties submitted
appropriate memoranda of law and the matter was submitted for decision by the trial
court on or about May 1, 1998. (R. 88 - 167).
3

On May 26, 1998, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision indicating that the
Wyoming Decree had not been properly registered, and indicated it would not issue a
ruling in the case until the Wyoming had been properly registered. (R. 170).
Mrs. Rockwood subsequently took steps to register the Wyoming Decree,
which steps were completed on or about June 19, 1999, and the matter was submitted
again for decision. (R. 185).
On or about August 10, 1998, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision,
awarding Mrs. Rockwood $36,654.32 in child support arrearages, and setting ongoing
child support at $301.79 for the parties' one remaining minor child. (R. 192).
On or about August 21, 1999, Mrs. Rockwood submitted a Motion for Attorney
Fees and a supporting affidavit. (R. 193). After reviewing memoranda supporting and
opposing the motion, on October 2, 1998 the Court issued a Memorandum Decision
awarding Mrs. Rockwood $1,500.00 in attorney fees. (R. 225) Appropriate Orders
were prepared, signed, and entered, whereupon Mr. Rockwood appealed the trial
court's decision. (R. 234).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The parties were divorced in 1983 in Wyoming. The Wyoming court
subsequently modified the decree in 1985. At the time of the 1985 modification the
parties had four minor children of the marriage, to wit:
Carrie Lee Rockwood, born August 13, 1975
Heather Rockwood, born April 22, 1977
4

Cindy Lou Rockwood, born October 11, 1978
Melissa Rockwood, born July 27, 1981
The 1985 Wyoming Order Modifying Decree ordered Chris L. Rockwood to
pay Cora L. Rockwood $75.00 per month per child for the support of the three oldest
minor children and $115.00 per month for the support of the youngest child, a total of
$340.00 per month.
The Order Modifying Divorce decree also mandated an automatic increase in
child support under certain conditions. The exact language of the Order Modifying
Decree provided, in relevant part, that:
the child support payments for the parties' minor children shall automatically
increase to be equal to 34% of the Plaintiffs (Chris L. Rockwood's) take-home
pay. The automatic increases shall become effective at such time as Plaintiffs
take-home pay meets the following increments: $1,200.00, $1,400.00,
$1,600.00, $1,800.00 and $2,400.00. In the event Plaintiffs take-home pay
exceeds $2,400.00, there shall no longer be any automatic increases in child
support. "Take-home" pay shall be defined as the amount of the Plaintiffs pay
after deduction for social security, Internal Revenue Service withholding tax,
State of Wyoming retirement, and those portions of medical and life insurance
which are mandatory deductions from a state employee's paycheck. The
plaintiff shall, in the event that his take-home pay exceeds these amounts,
execute a new order of payment of money to supersede the original order of
payment of money, which shall appropriately reflect the increase in his wages.
From the date it was entered in 1985 until 1997, neither Mrs. Rockwood nor the
Office of Recovery Services sought to enforce the "automatic increase" provisions of
the Wyoming Order. Instead, child support was paid and collected until 1997 using
the amount specified in the Wyoming Order without regard for the "automatic
increase" provisions.
5

The Order Modifying Decree did not state how its "automatic increase11
provisions would be affected as each of the parties' four children reached majority.
The parties' oldest minor child reached majority on August 13, 1993. The second
oldest minor child reached majority on April 22, 1995. The third oldest minor child
reached majority on October 11, 1996.
During approximately 1986, the parties both began residing in Utah. On or
about May 30, 1986, the Utah Department of Human Services, Office of Recovery
Services (ORS), began collecting child support from Chris L. Rockwood, and paying
the collected support amounts to Cora L. Rockwood. ORS child support collection
and wage withholding was continuous from May 1986 through the date of trial.
As of the end of January, 1997, the records of ORS show that Petitioner was
current on his child support obligation, as calculated by the Office of Recovery
Services based on the 1985 Wyoming Order Modifying Decree (but without making
any upward adjustment in support under the "automatic increase" provisions of the
1985 Order). Neither ORS nor Cora Rockwood asserted any right nor took any action
prior to 1997, to collect support based on the "automatic increase" provisions of the
1985 Order, despite that fact that ORS had been withholding child support from Chris
Rockwood's pay since 1986.
Chris Rockwood paid $3,910 in child support in 1990, $4,080 in child support
in 1991, $4,250 in child support in 1992, $4,120 in child support in 1993, $3,180 in
6

child support in 1994, $3,180 in child support in 1995, and $2,655 in child support in
1996. The total support paid by Mr. Rockwood between 1990 and 1996 was $25,375.
The Court made correct findings as to the amount of Mr. Rockwood's child support
payments for the years from 1990 through 1996. Mr. Rockwood's income for the
years from 1990 through 1996 was also correctly stated by the Court in its Findings.
Beginning in February, 1997 and continuing through the middle of May, 1997,
ORS began collecting $816.00 per month child support for the parties' one remaining
child, instead of the $115.00 amount specified with the 1985 Wyoming Order
Modifying Decree for the one remaining child, or a total of $2,453.50 in excess of the
1985 Wyoming Order (without regard for the "automatic increase" provisions of the
1985 Order).
On or about May 15, 1997, the parties stipulated to an order requiring Chris
Rockwood to pay Cora Rockwood ongoing support of $301.79. Beginning with the
second half of May, 1997 and continuing through trial, ORS began collecting the
newly stipulated monthly child support amount of $301.79.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in calculating child support arrearages. It calculated the
arrearages as 34% of Mr. Rockwood's income, regardless of the number of children.
The 34% percentage was set by the Wyoming Court as support for four children, and
should have been reduced proportionally as each child turned 18. The trial court
7

ignored Mr. Rockwood's arguments as to reduction for children as they reached
majority, and instead calculated support using the same percentage of income whether
there were four, three, two, or only one child. Wyoming law contemplates a reduction
in support as the children turn 18. Therefore, the trial court should have calculated the
support amount with a reduction as each child reached majority. The result would
have been a significantly smaller judgment for support arrearages than the judgment
entered by the Court.
The trial court also failed to consider estoppel as a reason for denying recovery
to Mrs. Rockwood. Mrs. Rockwood had not taken any action to collect or determine
the amount of child support which would have accrued if the "automatic adjustment"
provisions of the Wyoming Decree had been enforced. Instead, for eleven years she
contented herself with collecting the base child support specified in the Wyoming
Decree, and acted in such a way (or failed to act in such a way) that gave Mr.
Rockwood reason to believe that there was no reason to worry about the "automatic
adjustment" provisions of the Wyoming Decree. Therefore, Mr. Rockwood did not
bother to seek modification of the Wyoming Decree (though if he had sought
modification, the result would have been a support amount lower than the amount
specified in the "automatic adjustment" provisions). To permit Mrs. Rockwood to
now enforce the "automatic adjustment" provisions after years of sitting on her hands
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and doing nothing would be inequitable, and Mrs. Rockwood should be denied the
ability to recover any of the "arrearage".
Finally, the trial court awarded attorney fees to Mrs. Rockwood. The trial court
stated that to award fees it must find, among other things, that Mrs. Rockwood needed
financial assistance in paying her fees. The court then correctly stated that no
evidence was presented to show that Mrs. Rockwood needed financial assistance in
paying her fees and that the parties had similar incomes. Despite these contradictory
statements by the trial court, the trial court awarded Mrs. Rockwood $1,500 in
attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING CHILD SUPPORT
ARREARAGES. IT FAILED TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF THE
ONGOING SUPPORT AS EACH CHILD REACHED MAJORITY.
A.

Introduction.
At the time Wyoming entered its 1985 order modifying the child support, the

parties had four minor children living with Appellee. The Wyoming Court set child
support for the four children and then ordered that child support for the four children
would automatically increase to 34% of Appellant's net monthly income "to become
effective at such time as Plaintiffs (Petitioner's) take-home pay meets the following
9

increments: $1,200.00, $1,400.00, $1,600.00, $1,800.00, and $2,400.00." (R. 219,
paragraph 2 (quoting the Wyoming Order) and R. 16 (Wyoming Order)).
However, the Wyoming Order did not unambiguously specify how the child
support would be reduced as each of the four minor children reached majority. It was
completely silent on this issue. (R. 16 - 18).
While not making any explicit conclusions of law on this issue, the Trial Court
in this case apparently interpreted the silence or ambiguity in the Wyoming Order to
mean that the Wyoming Court intended that Appellant pay the same amount in child
support regardless of the number of minor children. (R. 217, paragraph 7). Therefore,
the Trial Court erroneously calculated the amount of the child support arrearages using
the formula in the Wyoming Order without taking into consideration that over the
years since the Wyoming Order was entered, three of the four children had reached
majority.
B.

Wyoming Law Regarding Adjustments When Children Reach Majority.
Under Wyoming law and its child support guidelines, child support is set using

a percentage of income formula. The percentage of the non-custodial parent's income
that must be used to pay child support varies based on the number of children covered
by the child support order, with greater percentages of income paid in child support
when a greater number of children are covered by the child support order. Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 20-6-304. Wyoming law, therefore, contemplates that child support should
10

vary based on the number of children, and should be reduced as the children reach
majority.
This conclusion is further supported by Section 14-1-101 of Wyoming Statutes
Annotated, which states that M[u]pon becoming eighteen years of age, an individual
reaches the age of majority and as an adult acquires all rights and responsibilities
granted or imposed by statute or common law, except as otherwise provided by law.M
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-1-101.
In addition, Wyoming cases have held that a non-custodial parent's duty of
support to children ends at emancipation or age eighteen, unless the children have
physical or mental disabilities which prevents the children from becoming
emancipated at age eighteen. E.g., Jennings v. Jennings. 783 P.2d 178 (Wyo. 1989);
Kamp v. Kamp. 640 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1982).1
Based on the foregoing, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the
Wyoming Court intended that Mr. Rockwood pay the same amount in child support
for one child as for four children. Clearly, the Wyoming Court was setting present and
future child support for all four children, and did not state the obvious fact that support
would be reduced proportionally as each child reached majority.

*In the instant case, no evidence was presented to the Trial Court that any of the children
had physical or mental disabilities which prevented the children from becoming emancipated
at age eighteen.
11

Any other interpretation of the Wyoming Order would be inconsistent with
Wyoming statutes and case law and would result in a windfall to Mrs. Rockwood, as
she would receive support for four minor children, even though she had fewer children
she was actually supporting.
C.

Conclusion,
To correct the improper interpretation of the Wyoming Order, this Court should

remand the case and order that the Trial Court recalculate the amount of the arrearages
by reducing the monthly accruing support amount by one-fourth of the total support
for each child for each month after such child attained majority, and correct the
amount of the judgment accordingly (assuming that Mrs. Rockwood's claims are not
dismissed under the reasoning of the arguments which follow).
POINT II
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL BARS MRS. ROCKWOOD FROM ENFORCING
THE "AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT" PROVISIONS OF THE CHILD
SUPPORT ORDER.
A.

Elements of Equitable Estoppel,
Under Utah law, equitable estoppel may prevent a party from obtaining relief it

seeks if all of the elements of equitable estoppel are present. Equitable estoppel is
established by proof of three essential, core elements: "(1) a party's statement,
admission, act, or failure to act that is inconsistent with a later-asserted claim; (2)
12

reasonable action or inaction by a second party, taken on the basis of the first party's
statement, admission, act, or failure to act; (3) injury to the second party resulting
from allowing the first party to repudiate its statement, admission, act, or failure to
act." Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services. 813 P.2d 1234 (Utah App. 1991)
(citing CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists. Inc.. 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989);.
Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n. 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979);
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd.. 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990)).
B.

Application of Equitable Estoppel to the Rockwood Case,
In the instant case, Mrs. Rockwood failed for a period of eleven (11) years from

1986 through 1997 to treat the automatic adjustment provisions in the Wyoming Order
as enforceable, or to attempt to collect or assert any right to collect child support in
excess of the base child support ordered in the Wyoming Order. (R. 249, page 6, line
17 through page 7, line 12). The Office of Recovery Services assessed and collected
base child support without regard for any automatic adjustment provisions, and
reduced the base support as each child reached majority. (R. 250, Defendant's Exhibit
3, ORS Computation of Child Support; R. 249, page 6, line 16 through page 7, line 2).
Mrs. Rockwood never objected to this procedure or sought any change in the monthly
support amount. (R. 249, page 26, lines 10-12; R. 249, page 35, line 17 through page
36, line 13; R. 249, page 42, lines 18-24). Mr. Rockwood cooperated with the Office
of Recovery Services in making regular monthly support payments. (R. 249, page 21,
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lines 2-5; R. 249, page 33, lines 1-7). At the time of trial, Mr. Rockwood was current
on his child support as shown by the Office of Recovery Services records using the
base support amount in the Wyoming Order. (R. 249, page 34, lines 3-9; R. 250,
Defendant's Exhibit 3, ORS Computation of Child Support).
Based upon Mrs. Rockwood's failure to take any action to enforce any
automatic adjustment provision of the Wyoming Order, Mr. Rockwood did not seek
modification of the child support order, but instead relied on Mrs. Rockwood inaction
in assuming that the automatic child support adjustment provisions of the Wyoming
Order would not be applied in his case. (See R. 249, Page 26, lines 1-12; R. 249, page
25, lines 3-10). However, as soon as Mrs. Rockwood and ORS began to seek
collection of child support under the automatic child support adjustment provisions of
the Wyoming Order, Mr. Rockwood immediately sought relief from the Court in the
form of a Petition to Modify the child support order. (R. 3-6) (an action that he
presumably would have taken much earlier if he had known that Mrs. Rockwood had
any intention to seek to enforce the automatic child support adjustment provisions of
the Wyoming Order).
As a result of Mrs. Rockwood's failure to seek enforcement of the automatic
adjustment provisions for eleven years, Mr. Rockwood will suffer injury in the form of
a substantial child support arrearage, which he could have avoided if he had not
reasonably believed that Mrs. Rockwood did not intend to enforce such provision.
14

Even the trial court indirectly acknowledged that had Mr. Rockwood filed a petition to
modify years earlier he would not face such a huge arrearage now. (R. 214, paragraph
2a, in which the Trial Court acknowledged that the monthly child support under the
automatic adjustment provisions of the Wyoming Order were in an "amount
substantially in excess of then-effective child support guidelines in Wyoming." In
other words, a petition to modify filed many years earlier would have resulted in much
lower child support than the amount specified in the 1985 Wyoming Order).
The large arrearage will have a substantial detrimental financial impact on Mr.
Rockwood's current family. (R. 249, page 19, line 8 through page 20, line 14).
All three elements of equitable estoppel are met. Mrs. Rockwood, through
inaction, led Mr. Rockwood to believe that the "automatic adjustment" provisions of
the Wyoming Order were not going to be applied or enforced. As a result, Mr.
Rockwood did not seek any modification of the Wyoming Order, and therefore
suffered injury in the form of a larger support arrearage than would otherwise be the
case.
The courts of Utah have upheld estoppel in similar cases where custodial
parents have sought to recover of child support which previously accrued, but for
which they did not take any action for several years. For example, in Burrow v.
Vrontikis, a mother failed to take any action for seven years to collect child support in
a paternity case. The court denied her claim for child support arrearages on the basis
15

that latches/estoppel barred the claim. Burrow v. Vrontikis. 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah App.
1990).
In an almost identical case, where the Department of Human Services sought
reimbursement for welfare payments, the court applied the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to prevent the State from obtaining back child support because the mother had
acted inequitably in leading the father to believe that she would not seek child support.
State. Dept. of Human Services ex. rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 893 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1995).
C.

Conclusion.
As the instant case satisfies all three elements of the doctrine of equitable

estoppel, Mrs. Rockwood should be estopped from obtaining a judgment for child
support arrearages. She failed to act and remained silent on the issue for eleven years,
during which time Mr. Rockwood did not seek modification, to which he would have
otherwise been entitled. As a result, the enforcement of the automatic adjustment
provision will injure Mr. Rockwood by requiring that he pay substantially more child
support than he otherwise would have paid if Mrs. Rockwood had indicated her true
intentions much earlier.
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court should reverse and remand this case to
the District Court with instructions to dismiss Mrs. Rockwood's claim for child
support arrearages.

16

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES TO
MRS. ROCKWOOD.
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Annotated grants trial courts the power to award
attorney fees in divorce cases. The decision to award attorney fees is in the sound
discretion of the trial Court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
The trial court, in reliance on Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 826 (Utah App.
1991), correctly stated that ff[i]n order to award attorney's fees, this Court must find
(1) the requesting party is in need of financial assistance (2) the requested fees are
reasonable, and (3) the other party has the ability to pay." (R. 227, citing Crouse v.
Crouse, 817 P.2d 812 (Utah App. 1991).
The trial court then proceeded to completely ignore its own statement of the
law, and awarded attorney fees despite the lack of requisite findings. By so doing, the
Trial Court abused its discretion by incorrectly applying the facts to the law.
The Court correctly found that "[n]o evidence was before the Court as to the
financial need of the parties." (R. 227). The Court also correctly found that "the
parties' incomes are very similar." (R. 227) The Court did not make any findings
with regard to the reasonableness of Mrs. Rockwood's attorney fees, although it may
have assumed, without stating, that such fees were reasonable. (R. 227).
17

As no evidence was before the Court regarding whether Mrs. Rockwood was in
need of financial assistance in paying her fees, the first element of the three-prong test
for attorney fees must fail for lack of evidence. This is especially true in light of the
Court's correct statement that the parties' incomes are similar-a further indication that
Mrs. Rockwood was not in need of financial assistance in paying her attorney fees (at
least not in any more need than Mr. Rockwood).
The complete lack of evidence of financial need prevents the Court from
awarding attorney fees under Crouse. Thus, the District Court abused its discretion in
awarding fees without the required supporting evidence and without meeting the test
for attorney fees in divorce cases.
Based on the foregoing, the Court should reverse the trial court's award of
attorney fees to Mrs. Rockwood.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant, Chris Rockwood asks that the Court reverse the judgment of the trial
court, and rule that Mrs. Rockwood is barred from obtaining the judgment sought for
arrearages, by reason of equitable estoppel. Alternatively, Mr. Rockwood seeks to
have the Court remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to recalculate the
child support arrearages after making a reduction in the arrearages to account for a
proportional reduction in child support as each child reached majority; which
reduction should have been, but was not included in the original child support
18

arrearage calculation. Finally, Mr. Rockwood requests that the Court reverse the trial
court's award of attorney fees.
DATED this ^ f day of July, 1999.

Counsel for Chris Rockwood
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to M. JAMES BRADY, Bradford & Brady, 389
North University Avenue, Provo, Utah 84601 this 22. day of July, 1999.
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ADDENDA

A.

Memorandum Decision (R. 192).

B.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 220).

C.

Judgment and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce (R. 222).

D.

Memorandum Decision on Attorney's Fees (R. 227).

E.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Motion for Attorney's Fees
(R. 229).

F.

Amended Judgment and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce (R. 231).
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Tab A

FILED
r.
•
Fourth Judicia' District Court
of Utah County State of Utah

CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk

Deputy

ciu^u^b,!??^
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Chris L. Rockwood,
Petitioner,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 974400544

Cora Lee Rockwood,
Respondent.

DATE: August 6, 1998
JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE

The above-entitled matter came on for trial March 3, 1998 upon the Petitioner's Amended
Petition to Modify Divorce Decree. The Respondent, Cora L. Rockwood, was present and
represented by her attorney, M. James Brady. The Petitioner, Chris L. Rockwood, was present
and represented by his attorney, Guy L. Black. Having heard the evidence and argument of both
parties, having reviewed the trial exhibits and the memoranda filed after trial and submitted for
decision on April 27, 1998, and pursuant to the parties' compliance with the registration and
notice requirements of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the Court now makes the
following findings and conclusions:
1.

The parties were married in Wyoming and divorced in that state in 1983. A Decree of

Divorce was entered by the Second Judicial District, for the State of Wyoming, Carbon County.
The Wyoming court subsequently modified the decree in 1985.
2.

The Order Modifying Divorce Decree ordered Petitioner to pay $75.00 per month for the

support of the three older children of the marriage and $115.00 per month for support of the
youngest child, a total of $340.00 per month. The modified decree also ordered an automatic
increase in Petitioner's child support payments. Petitioner was to pay 34% of his net monthly

1
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income to "become effective at such time as the Plaintiffs (Petitioner's) take-home pay meets the
following increments: $1,200.00, $1,400.00, $1,600.00, $1,800.00, and $2,400.00." Order
Modifying Divorce Decree p.3.
3.

Petitioner's average net monthly income for 1990 was $741.70. Respondent's Exhibit 2,

page 100024. Petitioner's average net monthly income for 1991 was $2,203.26. Respondent's
Exhibit 1, last page; Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 100023. Petitioner's average net monthly
income for 1992 was $2,595.56. Respondent's Exhibit 1, second to last page; Respondent's
Exhibit 2, page 100022. Petitioner's average net monthly income for 1993 was $2,682.40.
Respondent's Exhibit 1, page 10056; Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 100021. Petitioner's average
net monthly income for 1994 was $2,877.26. Respondent's Exhibit 1, page 100057;
Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 100020.

Petitioner's average net monthly income for 1995 was

$3,064.86. Respondent's Exhibit 1, page 10058; Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 100019.
Petitioner's average net monthly income for 1996 was $3,478.20. Respondent's Exhibit 1, page
100059; Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 100018.
4.

Petitioner paid $3,910 in child support for 1990. (23 payments at $170 each).

Respondent's Exhibit 3, page 7. Petitioner paid $4,080 in child support for 1991. (24 payments
at $170 each). Respondent's Exhibit 3, pages 6-7. Petitioner paid $4,250 in child support for
1992. (24 payments at $170 each, $189.54 once, and he received a refund of $19.54. Note also
that the ledger shows a refund of $170 credited to ABS, not the Petitioner.) Respondent's
Exhibit 3, pages 4-5. Petitioner paid $4,120 in child support for 1993. (17 payments at $170
each, $74 once, $57 once, $113 once, 8 payments at $132.50 each, and he received a refund of
$74.) Respondent's Exhibit 3, page 4. Petitioner paid $3,180 in child support for 1994. (8
payments at $265 each, 2 payments at $132.50 and 2 payments at $397.50). Respondent's
Exhibit 3, page 3. Petitioner paid $3,180 in child support in 1995. (10 payments at $265 each,
$132.50 once and $397.50 once). Respondent's Exhibit 3, pages 2-3. Petitioner paid $2,655 in
child support for 1996. (5 payments at $265 each and 7 payments at $190 each). Respondent's
2
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Exhibit 3, page 2. Petitioners child support payments for 1990-96 total $25,375.
5.

On March 17, 1997 the Petitioner filed a Petition to Modify Divorce Decree and

Subsequent Orders. In his petition the Petitioner sought to have this Court give full faith and
credit to the order modifying the Wyoming decree. (Pet. Modify at 3.) The Petitioner further
requested that this Court domesticate the Wyoming decree and subsequent orders thereto. (Aff.
Domesticate Out of State Divorce.) Petitioner filed an Amended Petition to Modify Divorce
Decree on April 3, 1997.
6.

Pursuant to the requirements of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, U.C.A. §§78-

45f-601, -610,-613 (1997), the parties properly registered for modification and enforcement in
this state their Wyoming Decree of Divorce and Order Modifying Divorce Decree and both
parties have received notice of the registration as contemplated by the Act.
7.

Wyoming law is the proper law to apply in enforcing the Wyoming Decree of Divorce and

Order Modifying Divorce Decree in Utah for the following reasons:
a. "A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its
own state on choice of law." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, §6. The Utah
Legislature directs that Wyoming law be applied. The statute in effect today, and at the time that
the foreign divorce was registered in Utah, has an express provision dealing with "Choice of law."
It reads, "(1) The law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration of
current payments and other obligations of support and the payment of arrearages under the
order." Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, U.C.A. 78-45f-604. Wyoming is the "issuing"
state and at the core of this action is the "extent" and "amount" of "arrearages under the order."
Therefore, the Court is bound to follow the legislative directive and apply Wyoming law to the
facts of this case.
b. Applying common law principles on choice of law, Wyoming law still must be applied
in this case. Assuming arguendo that pre-1994 Utah law should apply as Petitioner pleads, then
the automatic escalation clause would be invalid. "Petitioner's Memorandum of Law," April 2,
3
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1998, page 5; U.C.A. 78-45-7(1) (1992); Grover v. Grover. 839 P.2d 871 (Utah App. 1992).
But, Wyoming law is in conflict because automatic escalation of child support is valid in Wyoming
divorces if the resulting payment is "expressed in a specfic dollar amount." Wyo. Stat. §20-6304(a)(1997). Automatic escalation clauses like the one at issue here are within the Wyoming
statutory requirement. Madison v. Madison. 859 P.2d 1276 (Wyoming 1993).
Once a conflict of law is established, then the choice of law of the forum state determines
which law should be applied. American NatM Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins.. 927 P.2d 186 (Utah
1996). The "most significant relationship" test of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, is
the favored test applied to most actions involving conflicts of law in Utah. Records v. Briggs.
887 P.2d 864 (Utah App. 1994)(Utah follows the "most significant relationship" analysis of
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws for torts and contracts actions); American Nat'l Fire.
927 P. 2d at 188 ("The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship to the transaction and the parties."); See also Forsman v. Forsman. 779 P.2d 218
(Utah 1989).
Wyoming has the "most significant relationship" to the transaction and the parties. The
divorce occured there. At the time, both parties and all the children of the marriage were in the
state. The Modification of Divorce Decree was pursuant to stipulation of the parties. The
formation of the stipulation, i.e. the "negotiation of the contract," took place in Wyoming.
Records 887 P.2d at 869. And, the "reasonable expectation of the parties" that their deal,
including automatic escalation of child support payments, was valid under Wyoming law and was
a center piece to the stipulation and resulting Modification. American NatM Fire. 927 P.2d at 191.
For the foregoing reasons, Wyoming law should be applied to enforce the automatic escalation
clause in the 1985 Wyoming Order Modifying Divorce Decree.
8.

Pursuant to application of Wyoming law to the Wyoming Decree and Order Modifying

Decree, Petitioner is required to pay child support as follows for the years 1990-96. In 1990,
4
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because his net income was under $1200 per month, Petitioner should have paid $340 per month
for 12 months—a total required payment of $4,080. In 1991, because his net income was over
$1,800 per month, Petitioner should have paid 34% of his net monthly income ($2,203.26
average), or $749 1 I per month for 12 months-a total required payment of $8,989.32 In 1992
to 1°4''- u^i'j.v n .

-v.

:

should have paid ^ '

* «

. in s II: lis l i 3t in: it : ::: i i le < i a s (>\ ei $2,400 pei i i lonth, Petitioi iieii:
(the cap pursuant to the Order Modifying Divorce Decree), or

$816 per month for 60 months—a total required payment of $48,960. Petitioner's expected child
support payments for 1990-96 total $62,029.32.* The difference between what Petitioner is
expected to pay and what he has actually paid in child support for 1990-96 is $36,654.32
9.

Child support orders ma> be modified ui idle i Wyoming Law when the "si ip pc i t ai i IOUI it

Wyo. Stat. 20-6-306 (19 77). Under the "(J oint Stipulation of the Parties Regarding Child Support
During the Pedency of the Action," the parties combined gross monthly income is $6,272.
Assuming taxes and deductions of 20% to arrive at the parties combined net monthly income of
$5,017.60, then the child support obligation of Petitioner under Wyo. Stat 20-6-304 would be

net monthly income of both parents which exceeds $4,680, with the total being divided between
the parents in proportion to the net income of each. Petitioner's income proportion is
$2,482.40/$5,017 60, or 49 5° o) The $415.54 child support amount that would be due under the
statute is more than 20% different from the current order of 34% of $2,400, or $816 Therefore,
this court MU\ -in a.!- the Wyoming Decree •*•: 1
s

* ' i

!

:

ii impv - *l*-M .••;.-• i . .

•• : >'/
t- *

*
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'

ce Deci ee

* -.1 support guidelines of

Wyoming which Petitioner could be ordered to pay. The amount Petitioner will be ordered to pay,
however, shall deviate from that amount. It would be "inappropriate," pursuant to Wyo. Stat 206-302, to require the Petitioner to pay the statutory presumptive $415.54 per month in continuing
child support for the following reasons:
5
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a. Petitioner will be ordered to pay on arrearages which accumulated on child support
amounts substantially in excess of then-effective child support guidelines in Wyoming,
b. This arrearage payment will be extremely large for 6-10 years,
c. This arrearage may not have accrued in Utah, had the divorce been issued here,
because of the prohibition against automatic escalation clauses at the time,
d. The parties and the children of the marriage are currently domiciled in Utah,
e. The suggested child support for these parties under the guidelines in Utah would be
less than that required in Wyoming, and
f. The parties wisely agreed to the amount provided for under the Utah guidelines in their
"Joint Stipulation of the Parties Regarding Child Support During the Pedency of the Action," and
for this and all of the above reasons, Petitioner will be ordered to pay child support in an amount
below the Wyoming Guidlines, but pursuant to Utah guidelines.
11.

Respondent will be ordered to pay child support arrearages of $36,654.32, and continuing

child support in the amount of $301.79, to continue until the remaining minor child has reached
majority.
12.

Counsel for Respondent is directed to prepare an Order Modifying Divorce Decree in

accordance with this decision, then to submit it to counsel for Petitioner for review, then to the
Court for execution.

i

Dated at Provo, Utah this /(_/

day of August, 199&
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this JiZTday of August, 1998:
Guy L. Black
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo.Utah 84604
Kim H. Buhler
389 North University >
Provo, Utah 84601

Deputy Clerk
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M. James Brady (3703)
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Attorneys for Defendant
389 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
(801) 374-6272
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xi, xxiL F O U R T H j r n i C l U DISTRICT C O U R I IN -v. - l ' ) !
STATE OF UTAH

HCOUNTY

CHRIS L. R O C K W O O D ,
FINDINGS OF FACT A N D
CONCLUSIONS OF L A W

Petitioner,

CORA I R O C K W O O D ,
Civil No. 974400544 CS
Judge Donald J. Eyre

Respondent.

Petitioner's Amended Petition to Modify Divorce Decree, and Respondent's Counter Petition. The
...

. .

e

Petitioner, Chris L. Rockwood, was present and represented by his attorney, Guy L. Black. The court
.icuid testimony and argument from L *,,.* parties, anu na\:nj: r c \ i u \ c a ;i;c ic^timon>. U\L exiuoits
admitted at trial and the memoranda filed after trial, the court entered its Memorandum Decision on
August 6, 1998. Based thereon, the Court hereby enters the following:

1.

The parties were married in Wyoming and divorced in that state in 1983. A Decree

of Di> '""oi: ce "vv as ei itei eel 1: ;; ' tl le Secoi id Ji idicial Disti i ::t fc i til. le State ot \V yon lii lg, Cai boi I Coi n it;; '.
I he Wyoming court subsequently modified the decree in 1985.
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Page I of'8

2.

The Order Modifying Divorce Decree ordered Petitioner to pay $75.00 per month for

the support of the three older children of the marriage and $115.00 per month for support of the
youngest child, a total of $340.00 per month. The modified decree also ordered an automatic
increase in Petitioner's child support payments. Petitioner was to pay 34% of his net monthly
income to "become effective at such time as the Plaintiffs (Petitioner's) take-home pay meets the
following increments: $1,200.00, $1,400.00, $1,600.00, $1,800.00, and $2,400.00." Order
Modifying Divorce Decree p.3.
3.

Petitioner's average net monthly income for 1990 was $741.70. Respondent's

Exhibit 2, page 100024. Petitioner's average net monthly income for 1991 was $2,203.26.
Respondent's Exhibit 1, last page; Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 100023. Petitioner's average net
monthly income for 1992 was $2,595.56. Respondent's Exhibit 1, second to last page;
Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 100022. Petitioner's average net monthly income for 1993 was
$2,682.40. Respondent's Exhibit 1, page 10056; Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 100021.
Petitioner's average net monthly income for 1994 was $2,877.26. Respondent's Exhibit 1, page
100057; Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 100020. Petitioner's average net monthly income for 1995
was $3,064.86. Respondent's Exhibit 1, page 10058; Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 100019.
Petitioner's average net monthly income for 1996 was $3,478.20. Respondent's Exhibit 1, page
100059; Respondent's Exhibit 2, page 100018.
4.

Petitioner paid $3,910 in child support for 1990. (23 payments at $170 each).

Respondent's Exhibit 3, page 7. Petitioner paid $4,080 in child support for 1991. (24 payments at
$170 each). Respondent's Exhibit 3, page 6-7. Petitioner paid $4,250 in child support for 1992.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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(24 payments at $170 each, $189.54 once, and he received a refund of $19.54. Note also that the
ledger shows a refund of $1 / 0 ci edite d t

'! ! c

"!l !"'? :: } "i: ? +; t: •• % ?:

Respoi idei it's Exhibit 3 pages

4-5. Petitioner paid $4,120 in child support for 1W * < I T payments at $ 170 each, $74 once, $57
once, $11 ^ once, 8 payments at $132.50 cacn. and he received a icimid of $74.) Respondent's
h ! : ; " * -M*\ ^ I1.-:-:-: - rpaid$3,lNwi-. child -;p:vr tor 1994. (8 payments at $265 each, 2
payments at $132.50 and 2 payments at $397.50). Respondent's Exhibit 3, page 3. Petitioner paid
$3,180 ii .< hih I ;i i| : »} i i il i • IS •$ 5

(10 j « ;y n u : t its i it $265 each, $132 50 ( )i ice and $397 50 i; >nce).

Respondent's Exhibit 3, pages 2-3. Petitioner paid $2,655 in child support for 1996. (5 payments at
S~u:- each and 7 payments at $l^u cacu. respondent b nxiiiOit J. page _. rjiiuoners child
support payments for 1990-96 total $25,375.
5.

On March 17, 1997, the Petitioner filed a Petition to Modify Divorce Decree and

to the order modifying the Wyoming decree. (Petition to Modify at 3.) The Petitioner further
requested that tl: lis Coi in: t :lc i nesticate tl le ^ " ;; on ling deci ee and si it se qi lei it : -i iei s thei eto 0 V:f'f.
Domesticate Out of State Divorce.) Petitioner filed an Amended petition to Modify Divorce Decree
on April 3, 1.997.
6.

Pursuant to the requirements of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, LLC. A.

§§78-45f-601, -610, -613 (1997), the parties properly registered for modification and enforcement
in: I tl lis state tl le

•*

f

•• •

'• J i); - ] •

"*^ ]

' ^\<IK--! h . r. ....

h

parties have received notice of the registration as contemplated by the Act.
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7.

Pursuant to application of Wyoming law to the Wyoming Decree and Order

Modifying Decree, Petitioner is required to pay child support as follows for the years 1990-96. In
1990, because his net income was under $1,200 per month, Petitioner should have paid $340 per
month for 12 months-a total required payment of $4,080. In 1991, because his net income was
over $1,800 per month, Petitioner should have paid 34% of his net monthly income (2,203.26
average), or $749.11 per month for 12 months-a total required payment of $8,989.32. In 1992 to
1996, because in each of those years his net income as over $2,400 per month, Petitioner should
have paid 34% of $2,400 (the cap pursuant to the Order Modifying Divorce Decree), or $816 per
month for 60 months-a total required payment of $48,960. Petitioner's expected child support
payments for 1990-96 total $62,029.32. The difference between what Petitioner is expected to pay
and what he has actually paid in child support for 1990-96 is $36,654.32.
8.

Child support orders may be modified under Wyoming Law when the "support

amount will change by twenty percent (20%) or more per month from the amount of the existing
order." Wyo. Stat. 20-6-306 (1977). Under the "Joint Stipulation of the Parties Regarding Child
Support During the Pedency of the Action," the parties combined gross monthly income is $6,272.
Assuming taxes and deductions of 20% to arrive at the parties combined net monthly income of
$5,017.60, then the child support obligation of Petitioner under Wyo. Stat 20-6-304 would be
$415.54 (The base child support obligation, as presumed by the statute, is $802 +11.1% of the net
monthly income of both parents which exceeds $4,680, with the total being divided between the
parents in proportion to the net income of each. Petitioner's income proportion is
$2,482.40/$5,017.60, or 49.5%). The $415.54 child support amount that would be due under the

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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statute is more than 20%o different from the current order of 34% of $2,400, or $816. Therefore, this
• .

.

...

^

i._

i'.

.i:cc

L'LXI

je.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
.1. .

Wyoming law is proper law to apply in enforcing the Vv yoming Decree of Divorce

and Order Modifying Divorce Decree in Utah for the following reasons:
a.

"A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory

The Utah Legislature directs that Wyoming law be applied. That statute, in effect today and
a; i L iiiiic ;:;.;! :..- ioieig:; divorce was registerec :.: • .ai:, has an express provision dealing
with "Choice of law.'" It reads, "(1) The law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent,
amount, and duration of current payments and other obligations of support and the payment

Wyoming is the "issuing" state and at the core of this action is the "extenf and "amount o\

directive and apply Wyoming law to the facts of this case.
b.

Applying common law principles on

CIIOILL- I-;

law. w \omniLi law ^iiil must

be applied in this case. Assuming arguendo that pre-1994 Utah law should apply as
Petitioner pleads, then the automatic escalation clause would be invalid. "Petitioners's
M :-i:r i.i"

,,),j

.:\\ '" \

83c) P.2d 871 (Utah App. IWI)
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But. Wyoming law is in conflict because automatic
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"expressed in a specific dollar amount." Wyo. Stat. S20-6-304(a)(1997). Automatic
escalation clauses like the one at issue here are within the Wyoming statutory requirement.
Madison v. Madison. 859 P.2d 1276 (Wyoming 1993).
Once a conflict of law is established, then the choice of law of the forum state
determines which law should be applied. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers
Ins,, 927 P.2d 186 (Utah 1996). The "most significant relationship" test of
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, is the favored test applied to most actions
involving conflic ts of law in Utah. Records v. Briggs. 887 P.2d 864 )Utah App.
1994)(Utah follows the "most significant relationship" analysis of Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws for torts and contracts actions); American Nafl Fire,
927 P.2d at 188 ("The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in
contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue,
has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties."); See also
fForsman v. Forsman. 779 P.2d 218 (Utah 1989).
Wyoming has the "most significant relationship" to the transaction and the
parties. The divorce occurred there. At the time, both parties and all the children of
the marriage were in the state. The Modification of Divorce Decree was pursuant to
stipulation of the parties. The formation of the stipulation, i.e. the "negotiation of the
contract," took place in Wyoming. Records 887 P.2d at 869. And, the "reasonable
expectation of the parties" that their deal, including automatic escalation of child
support payments, was valid under Wyoming law and was a center piece to the

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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stipulation and resulting Modification. American Nat'1 Fire. 927 P.2d at 191. For

escalation clause in the 1985 Wyoming Order Modifying Divorce Decree.
. 2.

Four Hundred fifteen and : ,

v

nan, (>*...;*: ., me presumptive child support

amount under the chid support guidelines of Wyoming which Petitioner could be ordered to pay.
The amount Petitioner will be ordered to pay, however, shall deviate from that amount It would be

presumptive $415.54 per month in continuing child support for the following reasons:
11
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amounts substantially in excess of then-effective child support guidelines in Wyoming,
iiis arrearage payment will be extremely large for 6-10 > ears,
u. i his arrearage may not have accrued in Utah, had the divorce been issued here, because
of the prohibition against automatic escalation clauses at the time,
iiln."

i I IL tiiilJit in .il'lli • m.im.'ijir .in 1 1 unviitl
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c. The suggested child support for these parties under the guidelines in Utah would be less
man mai required

•:..._ ... i

f. The parties wisely agreed to the amount provided for under the Utah guidelines in their
"Joint Stipulation i ; m^ rarues Regarding Lima Suppm; , mme tne jvaene\ m me
Action," and for this and all of the above reasons, Petitioner will be ordered to pay
em id support in an amount below the Wyoming guidelines, but pursuant to I Jtah
m :e:
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3.

Respondent will be ordered to pay child support arrearages of $36,654. 32, and

continuing child support in the amount of $301.79, to continue until the remaining minor child has
reached majority.
4.

Counsel for Respondent is directed to prepare an Order Modifying Divorce Decree in

accordance with this decision, then to submit it to the counsel for Petitioner for review, then to the
Court for execution.

z£

DATED this / /

day of September, 1998.

Approved as to form:

Guy L. Black
Attorney for Petitioner

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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M.James Brady (3703)
BRADFORD, BRADY & JOHNSON
Attorneys for Defendant
389 North University Ave
Provo, Utah 84601
(801) 374-6272

File No. 2947.02

JM mi- FOURTH IHDinAI DISTR1C1 COURI IN .At^JI) I-OR U T A H r o U N T Y
STATE OF UTAH

CHRIS L. ROCKWOOD,
Petitioner,
s

JUDGMENT AND ORDER MODIFY I N<;
DECREE OF DIVORCE

CORA L. ROCKWOOD,
Respondent.

.

MMIII'I

(Mini

HI

Civil No. 974400544 CS
Judge Donald J. Eyre

I ni liii ill ! I ill Hi \ I "I'I'M in inn1 (In hiiiini.ihli' Donald J Eyre. , on

Petitioner's Amended Petition to Modify Divorce Decree, and Respondent's Counter Petition. The
Respondent Cora L. Rock A ood w as pi esent and i : presented t > 1 lei attorne) , l"\ 1 lai nes Bi ady

I he

Petitioner was present and represented by his attorney, Guy L. Black. The court heard testimony and
argument from both parties, and having reviewed the testimony, the exhibits admitted a- ::iai ana me
memoranda filed after trial, the court entered its Memorandum Decision on August 6, 1998. The Court
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and based thereon, hereby enters the
In t i l l m J i n 1 i ii il>. f

JUDGMENT
Respondent i^ g;.;!

,.

:

.

.: • support

through December 1996 in the amount of $36,654.32.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE
Page I uf2

09 9 9
nJ t>J *«/

ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE
The Decree of Divorce and Amended Decree of Divorce previously entered herein is hereby
modified and Petitioner is ordered to pay child support in the amount of $301.79, to continue until
the parties' remaining minor child has reached majority.
DATED this _W?3ay of September, 1998.
BYITHE COURT:

Approved as to form:
'oaattt^

Guy L. Black
Attorney for Petitioner

JUDGMENT AND ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE
Page 2 of 2
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FILED

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

C A R M A B. S M I T H , Clerk

Oofrb^P*,]

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS L ROCKWOOD

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner,

CASE NO. 974400544
DATE: October 2, 1998

vs.

JUDGE: DONALD J EYRE

CORAL ROCKWOOD

CLERK: LLP
Respondent,

The above entitled matter came before the Court upon the Respondent's Motion for
Attorney's Fees. The Court has reviewed said motion and the memorandum and affidavit filed in
support thereof. The Court has also reviewed the memorandumfiledin opposition thereto.
This Court has discretion to order either party to pay the other party's attorney's fees in
a domestic case. See Muir vs Muir. 841 P2d736 (Utah App. 1992).

In order to award

attorney's fees, this Court must find: (1) the requesting party is in need offinancialassistance (2)
the requested fees are reasonable, and (3) the other party has the ability to pay; Crouse v Crouse.
817P2d 826 (Utah App. 1991).
In this case, the Respondent was the prevailing party. The Court having awarded her a
substantial judgment for child support arrearage based upon her counter-petition. The petitioner
havingfiledthe initial petition to modify the Wyoming Decree with respect to child support. In a
stipulation between the parties, the petitioner's monthly income was found to be $3,103 and the
respondent's monthly income was found to be $3,169. At the time of trial, there was evidence
that the petitioner had some income in excess of his monthly salary as an Orem City police officer
from other part time jobs. The parties current incomes are very similiar. There remains only one
minor child of the parties in need of support. No evidence was before the Court as to the financial
need of the parties.
For all the reasons set forth, the Courtfindsa reasonable attorney's fee in this matter to
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be $1,500. Counsel for the respondent is directed to prepare an order consistent with this
decision, submit it to opposing counsel for review, and then to the Court for execution
Dated at Provo, Utah this 2nd day of October, 1998.

BY THE COURT:

^

DONjQ^TEYRE
District Court Judge
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this 5jh day of October, 1998:
GUY L BLACK, 1840 N STATE STE 200, PROVO UT 84604
M JAMES BRADY, 389 N UNIVERSITY AVE, PROVO UT 84601

CARMAB SMITH
CLERK OF THE COURT

deputy Clerk
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M. James Brady (3703)
BRADFORD, BRADY & JOHNSON
Attorneys for Defendant
389 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
(801) 374-6272

File No. 2947.02

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CHRIS L. ROCKWOOD,
Petitioner,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

CORA L. ROCKWOOD,
Respondent.
Civil No. 974400544 CS
Judge Donald J. Eyre
The above entitled matter came before the court upon the Respondent's Motion for Attorney's
Fees. The court has reviewed said motion and the memorandum and affidavit filed inn support thereof.
The Court has also reviewed the Memorandum filed in opposition thereto. Based thereon, the Court
hereby enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent was the prevailing party, the Court having awarded her a substantial

judgment for child support arrearage based upon her counter-claim.
2.

In a stipulation between the parties, the Petitioner's income was found to be

$3,103.00. and the Respondent's monthly income was found to be $3,169.00.
3.

At the time of trial, there was evidence that the petitioner had some income in excess

of his monthly salary as an Orem City police officer from other part-time jobs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Page 1 of 2
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4.

The parties' current incomes are very similar.

5.

There remains only one minor child of the parties.

6.

No evidence was before the court as to the financial need of the parties.

7.

For the above reasons, a reasonable attorney's fee in this matter is $1,500.00.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

This court has discretion to order either party to pay the other party's attorney's fees in

a domestic case. See Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992).
2.

The elements established in Crouse v. Crouse 817 P.2d 826 (Utah App. 1991) have

bee met in that:

3.

a.

The requesting party is in need of financial assistance.

b.

A reasonable attorney's fee in this case is $1,500.00.

c.

The other party has the ability to pay.

Respondent is entitled to amended the judgment for child support arrearage to include

a judgment of $1,500.00 in attorney for her expenses incurred i^tfo^t-matter.
DATED this _/x_ day of October, 1 9 9 8 \

i ^ ^ ^ ^ S ^

Approved as to form:

GufT. Black
Attorney for Petitioner
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Page 2 of 2
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M. James Brady (3703)
BRADFORD, BRADY & JOHNSON
Attorneys for Defendant
389 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
(801) 374-6272
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File No. 2947.02

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CHRIS L. ROCKWOOD,
Petitioner,
vs.

AMENDED JUDGMENT
AND ORDER MODIFYING DECREE
OF DIVORCE

CORA L. ROCKWOOD,
Respondent.
Civil No. 974400544 CS
Judge Donald J. Eyre
This matter came on for trial March 3,1998, before the honorable Donald J. Eyre, on Petitioner's
Amended Petition to Modify Divorce Decree, and Respondent's Counter Petition. The Respondent
Cora L. Rockwood was present and represented by her attorney, M. James Brady. The Petitioner was
present and represented by his attorney, Guy L. Black. The court heard testimony and argument from
both parties, and having reviewed the testimony, the exhibits admitted at trial and the memoranda filed
after trial, the court entered its Memorandum Decision on August 6, 1998. The Court having entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and based thereon, hereby enters the following order:
JUDGMENT
Respondent is granted judgment against Petitioner for unpaid child support from 1990
through December 1996 in the amount of $36,654.32 and attorney fees in the amount of $1,500.00.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE
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ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE
The Decree of Divorce and Amended Decree of Divorce previously entered herein is hereby
modified and Petitioner is ordered to pay child support in the amount of $301.79, to continue until
the parties' remaining minor child has reached majority.
DATED this fn

day of October, 1998.

Approved as to form:

Guy L. Black
Attorney for Petitioner
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